Violence Culture by State and Peoples in Solving Indonesian Humanities Issues

Agus Raharjo
Faculty of Law, Universitas Jenderal Soedirman, Purwokerto - Indonesia

Abstract
Violence become familiar to the Indonesian people, like a culture in solving every humanities and community issues. The state and community are become violence producer together. Even more reproduced for time by time, so that it sounds like Indonesia is violent country. This research is qualitative research with historical approach, case study, and empirical. Some cases that are usually become violence sources are agrarian conflict and ethnic conflict. In the historical view, the violence’s are friendly with our nation, both showed to the public or hidden conflict. Amoek, is our contribution through the science for explaining the condition where the violence as the manifestation from hidden character of Malayan that seems very friendly, polite, and full of smile. Violence at the local level can be solved through reconciliation between citizens or revitalization and re-actualization of local wisdom. However, against state violence against the people, what can be changed is the mindset of state administrators in managing conflict. This change will help a lot in reducing violence in Indonesia.

Keywords: violence culture; amoek; local wisdom; structural violence; spiral of violence.

Introduction
There is a paradox that can be found in this country. On the one hand, we are too proud as a friendly nation, so it deserves to be a tourist destination for foreign tourists, but on the other hand in terms of facts and academic studies also shows that this country is full of violence, even said by Sukidi (2017) that Indonesia is a violent country as a reaction to Colombijn and Linbald’s (2002) work entitled Roots of Violence in Indonesia. Is this...
really the case, and how exactly is the position of the balance between peace and violence in this country.

Conclusions that are too excessive actually if it is said that Indonesia is a violent country, because other facts indicate that there is local wisdom which is the basis of harmonious life in society, as well as in resolving conflicts or violence often refers to local wisdom (Fidiyani, 2013). The problem is why the social institutions of local wisdom do not work at the right place and at the right time so that violence can arise.

Anthropological documents show that Indonesia is known as a laboratory for the creation of violence and at the same time a "library" for storing self-records of violence in the name of religion (Lay, 2009). Violence seems to be passed down from generation to generation so that it can be found up to now as one way of resolving conflicts. The state or government (and its collaboration with businessmen) has preserved the use of violence in resolving conflicts with citizens (especially agrarian conflicts) and the people also use it to compete for limited resources. Violence committed by the state or government against its people in Galtung's terminology is called structural violence. In structural violence, there is abuse of resources, insight and results of progress for other purposes or monopolized by a few people, then there is violence in this system (Windhu, 1992). This condition causes structural injustice which causes the emergence of various forms of violence (Lay, 2009). While violence that occurs horizontally between citizens, is often called "amoek", (Lay, 2006; Dwipayana, 2001). as a hidden potential of Malay people who are often sweet, friendly and smiling faces.

Violence does not seem to stop at one point, it moves and creates new violence. This is what Camara calls a spiral of violence, where violence will always arise wherever, especially when injustice (as the first spiral of violence) is present as a result of efforts by national elites to maintain their interests so as to maintain a structure that encourages the emergence of "sub-human" conditions, namely conditions substandard living is worthy of living as a normal human being. The "sub-human" condition will create persistent tension that will lead to violence in the form of rebellion among civil society as number two violence. When civil society protests arise everywhere, number three will emerge, namely repressive actions by the authorities (Camara, 2005). Camara's theory justifies the postulate of the theory of violence which states "violence be get violence" (Astuti, 2011).

Violence is actually not a single phenomenon, nor is it just Indonesia's monopoly. Almost all countries especially in third world countries and developing - violence becomes a daily sight, both of which result from personal, structural and cultural impulses. Even in the reformation era which was often said to be the antithesis of the new order which was full of violence, violence was still easy to find, and even became a habit and a new culture in resolving problem conflicts. Although the truth about Indonesia is violent country needs to be tested again, but the fact cannot be hidden that violence has become familiar with our ears and the horror nature of the violence no longer causes fear, instead it becomes a spectacle.
Research Problems

This article will examine the violence genealogy in Indonesia by basing data, facts and theories on violence. Law enforcement in resolving violence that often creates new problems also becomes one of the subjects. Based on the study of the weaknesses found in the settlement through legal channels and other social institutions, this article will also provide alternative solutions that can be used to overcome the problem of violence in Indonesia.

Research Method

This research is qualitative research with a case study approach, historical and empirical. The data sources are primary and secondary data. Data collection techniques with observation, interviews, and document search. The objectives of this research are legal norms and community behavior. Research informants are determined purposively which includes apparatuses of the state, law enforcement, affected communities, perpetrators or victims of violence, theorists and practitioners. Data is collected by interactive and non-interactive methods. The data obtained were analyzed with interactive analysis models.

Discussion

Genealogy of Violence in Indonesia

When referring to historical and cultural documents, violence as one of the basic characteristics hidden in humans has existed since human existence itself. In Michel Foucoul't’s (1997) note, state violence is displayed to the public as a way of punishing people who have committed crimes, both to the king, the state and individuals. It is this way of displaying punishment with violence which then becomes one of the reasons for the birth of a theory in criminal law regarding psychological coercion (psychologische zwang) in addition to the criminal threat contained in the written law, where people who see are forced psychologically not to commit a crime if they do not want to be treated or punished by violence before the public by the authorities.

This execution became a spectacle favored by the French public and lasted from the 17th to the 18th centuries. Public violence became a political ritual by placing a power mechanism that touched the body roughly and cruelly into a power strategy model (Dwipayana, 2001). Over time, there has been a shift from public torment to time management (in prison), even though the story of violence behind prison even in the process of going to prison (criminal justice process) is still an interesting story to date, especially with the various international conventions and national constitutions that prohibit violence in handling criminal cases.

Violence against the public in Indonesia by the authorities is not something foreign in Indonesian history. Of course, the most phenomenal is the massacre tragedy after the events of September 30, 1965, which lasted almost a year on Java and Bali. Events that have
claimed thousands of lives are still a mystery and a debate and a dead end in the solution, because each party feels the most right, an obstacle that should be removed in an effort towards reconciliation.

Long before the event, the rite of violence was familiar with the Indonesian nation as part of public punishment carried out by kings or tribal-based political entities. This can be found in fine punishment artifacts that take various forms and terms, such as in Bali known as ‘dilebok’ (immersed in the sea with ballast); in Java, the shape is drawn to the four corners, beheaded and punched; whereas in the Dayak tribe, the cut-off law is applied to (kayau) and the starch of life. Public punishment has become part of a political ritual ceremony to uphold the power that has been ‘injured’ (Dwipayana, 2001).

In the context of tribal society, violence (torture) also becomes part of liturgy of public punishment. As part of the liturgy, torture must meet two demands. First, the torture must carve the mark on the victim viciously, so it is not strange if violence takes the form of ‘slices’ of the limbs that are used as a ‘memento’ for the success of a punishment. Second, torture must show the power of punishment to the public. Therefore, in addition to being horrible, torture must also be seen by many people. One form of power expression most favored by some tribes in Indonesia is to display head pieces in public. The fragment of the head on display is a representation of the power possessed by the tribe who did it (Dwipayana, 2001).

One of the words that is popular on this issue is ‘amoek’. In contrast to the rites of violence carried out by the authorities to show their power, amoek is a rite of violence played by individuals that relates to individual expressions and motives. Amoek is a sudden change in one’s behavior that was previously known as a good, calm and trusted person. The concept of amoek has evolved from penfasiran to a psychiatric term in the vocabulary of social sciences to describe complex patterns of behavior. Sulzberger wrote, Indonesians are gentle and instinctively polite, but behind their smiles there is strange Malay line, which is bloodthirsty madness that has clogged Malay words, amoek to other languages. Amoek is often connoted as a mysterious characteristic of Malay people, but this stigma is actually too tendentious, because anyone who feels threatened or insulted - not just malays - will do the same thing (violence) to defend themselves (Dwipayana, 2001).

The incidence of amok in the classical sense always involves momentary insanity because, and almost always, severe physical pain. The real symptoms of amoek are: first, murder by a man who loses self-control; second, the killer experiences a prodromal period in mental depression; third, murder is carried out haphazardly and without any motives; and fourth, the killer does not remember that he has committed acts of violence. In its development, amoek is formulated as killing or injuring relatives or other people without feeling, used to explain consistent behavior, which involves a more complex cause than psychiatric factors. Thus, in this broad interpretation, political, social and cultural factors are added to explain amoek (Dwipayana, 2001).

Psychologically, amoek starts from people’s thoughts, feelings and awareness about disappointment. Amoek at the community level occurs because of deep and widespread
frustration among the community because there is a discrepancy between people's value expectation and their value capability which causes frustration. People who experience disappointment with expectations and unfair treatment are the main motives for amoek action (Dwipayana, 2011).

During the New Order era, rites of violence by the state were maintained day by day, and the rites of tribal violence were successfully suppressed. The approach used is a military neo-fascism system approach, namely the regulation of legal legitimacy for the military's extraordinary role in almost all fields (Dhakidae, 1999). At this time, the concentration of military power was not only against foreign threats, but also against domestic threats that disrupted the course of the development program. There was also a pattern of cultural change in the values of leadership beliefs to support organized state violence. Violent reproduction arises everywhere with the pretext of order or public interest, thus giving rise to conflict between the state and the people (Manik, 2013).

Some of the most phenomenal events of state violence at this time were the massacre of thousands of people identified as followers of the Indonesian Communist Party in 1965-1966; the mysterious shooting (Petrus) in the 1980s which caused quite a lot of casualties, especially former criminals, a policy that went beyond law and human rights; at least 16,000 people were lost due to the clash of political, economic and ideological interests of the country through the practice of disappearing people; violence in Aceh, Papua, East Timor, Lampung; handling mass demonstrations by security forces with a violent approach; agrarian conflict, inter-religious conflict and many more. All of these events actually indicate the weakness of the state's ability to manage violence (the excessive use of violence or the inability to enforce the law) will ultimately continue to provide space for acts of violence in the community. Poor management of violence by the state can be considered as a factor that has contributed to the emergence of various acts of violence in the community (Manik, 2013).

Seeing Indonesia's familiarity with violence raises questions about what causes it. This question relates to the root or source of violence itself. The roots of violence vary greatly. Some, as the approach of social psychology argues, are inherent in human instincts as "beings". In this context, violence arises as a result of the battle of two instincts inherent in libido which ends with Thanatos domination which is a destructive instinct for eros as a life instinct. Others, come back to structural causes, are like social, economic and political systems. From this point of view, violence is an important part of what Geertz describes as structuring meanings in culture as a fundamental part of the exertion of power effort in the category of structures that contest. While the remaining part is related to the values inherent in culture or ideology, including religion, and is inherent in the descriptive system of community dissipation (Lay, 2009).

From another perspective, violence may be an irrational act, but in other cases, violence is a form of rational choice of action. Some research confirms that violence is a rational choice. Lichbach, for example, uses the word "selective incentive" to explain the involvement of farmers in certain rural upheavals that are based on their respective
calculations of future benefits offered by a specific upheaval. In its soft form, as argued by Scott, violence is also a routine choice based on the daily life of farmers in dealing with repression structures that work in their daily lives (Lay, 2009).

Susan (2009) provides an explanation of the root problem of the emergence of violence. One of them is Max Neef’s theory of basic human needs. Violence in many ways is associated with the non-fulfillment of basic human needs. Unmet basic needs are a threat to the existence of life, because humans are hit by anxiety. Expression of anxiety in social relations can be manifested in various forms of action and behavior, including violence. For Indonesian people who are multi ethnic, they are very vulnerable to conflict, especially if the prerequisites of social anxiety are fulfilled. Expression of social anxiety gives a high possibility of triggering communal violence (Astuti, 2011; Taufik, 2016; Andries, Maso’ed and Bagir, 2014).

Another theory to explain collective violence is the relative deprivation theory of Ted Robert Gurr (1970; The Wahid Institute, 2014). According to Gurr, political conditions which are characterized by turmoil in community resistance to the state and various forms of dissatisfaction occur, triggered by deprivation or seizure of something that is valued, valuable and beneficial. Feelings of being deprived called relative deprivation according to Gurr are defined as actors’ perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities (a perception of the gap between the expected value and the ability to achieve the required value). Furthermore Gurr divides the patterns of disappointment that can be experienced by a person into three, namely: 1) decremental deprivation, which is a condition that occurs when the expectations of a person are constant, while the ability to meet expectations decreases; 2) aspirational deprivation, a condition in which the expectations of a person increase but the possibility of fulfilling that expectation is in essence; 3) progressive deprivation, which occurs when a person’s expectations increase, but the ability to meet these expectations actually decreases. People with progressive disappointment will usually take the action of open resistance accompanied by acts of violence. Relative deprivation will result in dissatisfaction in society which can be manifested in the form of anger and irritation. Conditions of dissatisfaction that do not get channels will turn into rebellions with violence (Astuti, 2011). This form of violence in Indonesia appears as amoek.

**Horizontal and Structural Violence in Indonesia as a Culture**

There are two categories of horizontal violence or structural that usually happen in Indonesia, that are violence that come from inter-religious conflict and agrarian conflict. Inter-religious conflict is exactly in Indonesia based on various religions or beliefs. Kimball explained there are 5 (five) factors that make the religion tainted and lead to violence, that is claim of absolute truth, blind obedience to the religion leaders, tend to ideal era, justification to all ways for achieving the goal, and offensive shouting for holy war (Taufik, 2014).
Religious conflict is often defined in two ways. First, the conflict in which religion itself is the center of incompatibility (substantial). Second, the conflict in which the actors involved adhere to different religious traditions so that they have different identities (functional in nature). This second definition is more often termed inter-religious conflict (Matulessy 2013; Rahmi, 2012; Zainuddin 2013; Raharjo, 2015). The second definition contains the notion of conflict between religious communities of different religions or those with the same religion but different sects, sects or schools of thought (or commonly called internal religious conflicts).

There are 3 (three) hypotheses linking religious factors with conflict (Basedau, et.al., 2011; Raharjo, 2015), namely:

1. From a socio-psychological perspective, diverse religious identities form group identity and can result in escalating dynamics between groups. People will tend to favor people of the same religion because they are considered as one group compared to other people whose religious identities are different. This increases the potential for escalation of violence against people from other religious groups.

2. Religious identity is special because it is connected with shared ideas, norms, and values that are legitimized by transcendental sources. Transcendental nature then creates absolute truth claims (from God) that cannot be contested by humans. Therefore, identity based on transcendental norms and values is difficult, even non-negotiable/compromised. This increases the tendency of violent behavior by religious actors against those who do not believe in or adhere to different religious traditions. Through claims to be the most correct, they consider themselves innocent when committing violence in the name of religion, even they are motivated by the reward for doing so. In other words, religious conflict is usually seen as a zero-sum game, where the losing party will start fighting again once he gets the chance (Lindberg 2008).

3. The religious factor is often understood as a possible source of mobilization in conflict. Leaders (religious) can (easily) politicize religion to mobilize followers to take collective action and get involved in conflict. In fact, the conflict may not actually be about religious issues, but is rooted in other issues such as politics and socio-economics.

Several previous studies also proved quantitatively the relationship between conflict and religion. Research Basedau, et.al., (2011) concluded that religion plays a significant role in armed conflict in Africa. This religious polarization is prone to conflict only when combined with religious discrimination and religious tensions. Fox in Lindberg (2008) also found that based on the t-test statistical test, conflicts with religious differences tend to result in more deaths and higher intensity than conflicts without religious differences. Even in conflict resolution, Svensson found that religious conflicts were unlikely to be resolved through negotiations (Raharjo, 2015).

The three hypotheses and research results explain why conflicts involving religious issues tend to last a long time and are difficult to resolve. Even if it is resolved with the victory of one of the parties, conflict has the potential to occur once the losing party gets a chance. In fact, the religious conflicts that occur are generally rooted in non-religious
issues. Therefore, the conflict resolution that should be implemented must at least include two things. First, resolve the root causes of the real conflict. Second, rebuilding relations between religious groups that have deteriorated due to the politicization of religious issues (Raharjo, 2015). In addition, it is also necessary to get rid of the potential that triggers conflict, namely prejudice, especially among the internal religion itself caused by a lack of understanding of the rites and rituals of other religious groups (Alfandi, 2013).

The issue of inter-religious conflict in Indonesia often involves Islam as one of its parties. This is unavoidable considering the majority of adherents of Islam or who have an identity as Muslims. Seeing this, the behavior of Muslims became dominant in society and enjoyed privileges that other religions could not enjoy. This creates the possibility of using “symbolic violence”. This condition was exacerbated by the rise of conservatism and radicalization of religious backgrounds – especially Islam – after the reform era (1998). Recognition and respect for minority rights often leads to intolerance, so it is necessary to strengthen dialogue between groups and religions to avoid endless conflicts (Sarhindi (2017).

The practice of freedom of religion and believing as a part of from the construction of religious and state relations in Indonesia still leaving a lot of problems. The statistic data from The Wahid Institute recorded the occurrence of religion freedom violations/belief (Kebebasan Beragama dan Berkeyakinan/KBB) in 2014 is 158 incidents with 187 actions. Compared in 2013, the incidents are decreased to 42%. In 2013, the amounts of incidents are 245. This number is also down 12% in 2012. in 2015 (The Wahid Institute, 2014). SETARA Institute recorded 196 incidents of KBB violations with 236 forms of action spread throughout Indonesia. Compared to last year, this figure shows a significant increase. In 2014, the number of incidents of violations that occurred "only" 134 events, while acts of violation "only" in number 177 action. Increased KBB violations must be taken seriously by stakeholders (Halili, 2016). Meanwhile, National Commission of Human Rights (Komnas HAM) recorded the number of complaints of violations of the rights to KBB in 2015, totaling 87 complaints. This number increased compared to 2014 which only amounted to 74 complaints (an average of 6 complaints/month) (Komnas HAM, 2015).

Based on the distribution of the region, both The Wahid Institute, SETARA Institute and Komnas HAM, place West Java as the highest place in violation of KBB rights, followed by DKI Jakarta, Aceh, East Java and later DI Yogyakarta. In terms of actor actions, The Wahid Institute (2014) recorded 80 (51%) events involving 98 (52%) state actors; while 78 (49%) events involved 89 (48%) non-state actors. SETARA Institute notes, out of 236 forms of violations of freedom of religion/belief, there are 98 state actions involving state administrators as actors, compared to 138 actions taken by non-state actors. Compared to last year's data, violations committed by state actors experienced a sharp increase, from the previous "only" 39 actions to 98 actions in 2015. Cumulatively the percentage of classifications of actions based on this actor did not experience much shift from year to year. Citizens groups always occupy the highest ranks of actors in violation of freedom of
religion/belief (Halili, 2016). Komnas HAM (2015) actually noted that almost 70% of KKB violations were committed by the state.

Komnas HAM in 2015 assessed that the Ahmadiyya Indonesian Jama'at (JAI, Jema'at Ahmadiyah Indonesia-Red.) as the most victims, SETARA Institute actually recorded Shia as the biggest victim. They were victims in 31 events. Five other groups that were victims were groups of citizens and Christians became victims in 29 events, Muslims became victims in 24 events. Subsequently adhering to the belief stream in 14 events, while JAI in 13 events.

Conflicts that carry religious issues generally have the potential to become conflicts that are very difficult to resolve (intractable conflict) and last long (Jeong, 2008). In addition, religious-based conflicts can also become more complicated when involving ethnicity issues, where certain ethnic groups become adherents of different religions so that it is known as the ethnoreligious conflict (Fox, 2002; Kadayici-Orellana in Bercovitch et.al (eds), 2009; Aisyah BM, 2014). Some examples of classical conflicts involving religious issues are the Poso, Ambon case and conflict with smaller escalation rates in Central Java, West Java, East Java and South Sulawesi.

Land has always been an interesting issue to be studied from various sides. For Indonesians, land has an important meaning so that life will be sacrificed to defend it. Because of this importance, the agrarian conflict always attracts attention, not only because of the value of the land, but the effort to seize and defend it is always accompanied by violence, both individual/personal and structural. The agrarian conflict had existed long before the colonial era, and in the colonial era this conflict did not recede. Agrarian conflict reaches a high level of escalation (accompanied by violence) during the New Order era which requires communal land and community members to implement development programs.

The agrarian conflict during the New Order government experienced a very significant escalation with two very common forms of conflict, namely: first, the conflict between farmers and the private sector, mainly due to the issuance of the right to cultivate land that had been controlled by the people for generations; second, conflict between farmers and the government, related to land acquisition on land that has been controlled or owned by farmers for the development of various public interests. Agrarian conflict continues to occur when entering the reform era even more massive with the phenomenon that is very prominent is the reclaiming of farmers against lands controlled by the private sector both for plantation, mining, livestock, and so on (Astuti, 2011), as happened in Register 45 Mesuji, Lampung (Ferdian and Soerjatsnanta, 2017; Wahab, 2013; Pujiriyani, 2013; Pujiriyani and Wahab, 2013; Wahab and Ridho, 2016; Ferdian, 2017); Soppeng, South Sulawesi; the establishment of cement factories in Rembang and Pati, Central Java, and other conflicts in the name of development that displaced residents' land.

Lampung is indeed a conflict-prone area (Silvana, 2013). The conflict in the Production Forest Area on Register 45, Mesuji Regency, Lampung is quite interesting because it became a national issue in 2011 and continues to develop into a chronic agrarian conflict.
Report of the Joint Fact-Finding Team (TGPF) (2012) The Mesuji case found the root causes of the conflict, namely changing government policies, not being coordinated, minimal government supervision, investors who do not fulfill their obligations, misuse of permits, marginalized people and become aggressive. The operation of land speculators, has caused the dispute in Register 45 to continue and never be completely resolved.

Moro-Moro residents are community entities who entered the forest area in the era of the economic crisis in 1996 because they saw the abandoned land and were active in producing the land. Lives in the Register 45 production forest area whose management rights are controlled by PT. Sylvia Inhutani feels the difficulty of facing pressure and various acts of discrimination carried out by the government due to agrarian conflicts, and has the status of "encroachers" or "illegal people". Another consequence is the state's intentional neglect of the constitutional rights of citizens, such as not having an Identity Card (KTP) along with other population documents; lost political rights, access to education and health (Wahab and Ridho, 2016; Wahab, 2013; Susan and Wahab, 2014; Selviani, et al., 2017).

The above condition is an illustration of how land tenure is carried out by the ruling actor (government) collaborating with businessmen (companies) in annexing land, which results in the emergence of further land conflicts or consequences. The root of the problem is the unclear legal instruments, ambiguous policy implementation, and the sluggish performance of public institutions for the public interest which are intertwined with the expansion of industrial activities of business entities and government agencies (Rachman, 2013; Tohari, 2014; Maladi, 2012). In this kind of conflict, it is clear how the domination of the state is in creating and resolving conflicts.

The social conflicts that occurred in Rembang and Pati related to the establishment of a cement factory in an area rich in limestone occurred in the pre-construction stage. The company, supported by the local government, continues to make efforts to realize the construction of a cement factory, meanwhile local community groups through self-organization, network development and collective actions oppose any attempt to establish a cement factory. Efforts to resolve or resolve this conflict are very winding and complicated. The two parties concerned are very difficult to reconcile. The Central Java Provincial Government, which can actually stand as a mediator for those in conflict, seems to be one-sided, not neutral. The actions of citizens who shackled themselves in front of the Jakarta State Palace also did not produce satisfactory results, and the conflict continued (Suharko, 2013; Suharko, 2017; Fitri and Akbar, 2017; Harnanto et al., 2018).

Land conflicts which are accompanied by structural violence by state apparatuses caused by inaccuracy and prudence of the army in reading the contents of the agreement and the development of leased land occur in South Sulawesi. In Bara-Baraya, South Sulawesi, the army used its power to try to displace landowners. Residents who feel that they own the land are desperately trying to defend it. Several times the army carried out structural violence in the form of intimidation and action which led to the resistance of the people, even if it was uncontrollable there could be an amoek, given the strong
Makassar character. Structural violence can also be found in the reclamation project at Losari Beach Makassar. The affected residents complained of reduced income, as well as the Takalar people whose income was reduced due to the taking of sand by investors (who were protected by security apparatuses) to reclaim Losari Beach.

Various cases originating from agrarian conflicts are ultimately not just land issues. This is because agrarian conflicts cannot be separated from social relations related to controlling and using agrarian resources. These social relations generally involve elements of society, state and business, all of which try to fight agrarian resources (Afrizal, 2006). Agrarian conflict is a chronic conflict that haunts the management of agrarian resources in Indonesia. The amount and intensity of violence that accompanies the conflict in almost all parts of Indonesia indicates that there are problems where the roots of the conflict have not been completely addressed, so that long-standing conflicts have not been resolved. Meanwhile, local, national and global dynamics provide new pressures that have the potential to increase the occurrence of agrarian conflicts in many parts of Indonesia (Mulyani, 2014).

In addition to violence caused by conflicts between religious and agrarian communities, conflicts also often appear horizontally between citizens or ethnic groups. This conflict can occur for economic, political or socio-cultural reasons. Indigenous or local people often lose competition with immigrants so that socio-economically have lower strata compared to migrants. On the other hand, often immigrants do not respect indigenous people by giving a lazy, arrogant, not creative stigma that causes them to lose their competition so that their lives fall.

This case occurred in inter-ethnic conflicts in Sambas and Sampit in West Kalimantan; and between Lampung people and migrants from Bali in South Lampung (Hidayat, Kuswarno, Zubari, and Hafiar, 2017). The social conflict in sambas and sampit of West Kalimantan was due to social inequality between indigenous people (Dayak) and migrants (Madura). Theoretically, differences in ideology, religion, economics, politics, language, education, culture and other social norms, will lead to social friction and stereotypical views of ethnicity which are susceptible to the emergence of seeds of conflict if social reality reveals selfishness and fanaticism. value of ethnicity. The seeds of conflict are latent, especially if they are supported by the hope of mastering and maintaining power-privilege-prestige (Al Humaidy, 2007).

Since the various cases of violence that exist, both horizontal and structural, showed that the ways of handling problems are always accompanied by violence. In fact, it also showed the failure of the state in carrying out the constitutional mandate to prosper and protect its people. When people need protection, the state actually puts pressure, when the people try to defend their rights, the state seizes them. This is life in a full of violence country, a country that failed to manage conflict, a country that always uses power libido in problem solving. Violence seems to be an institution that transcends and even becomes culture itself. Legal institutions that should be neutral, not working and even siding.
Seeing the reality of the state cannot be used as a backbone in managing conflict and violence, in the end the community members seek their own solutions. There are those who use local wisdom as a means through revitalization and re-actualization (Sinaga, 2014; Irianto and Margaretha, 2011; Bakri, 2015; Hartimah, et.al., 2021), religious approaches (Jati, 2015), cultural approaches (acculturation) (Humaedi, 2014), the creation or arousing of a sense of respect between indigenous people and migrants, as well as the creation of new agreements (Setiawan, 2015), including the use of customary law institutions (Sulastriono, 2014).

The conflict resolution model using local wisdom can be found in Lampung ulun (people) as local ethnic groups who are marginalized, less respected by migrants, so they are stigmatized because their actions are often outside the context of Piil Pesenggiri. Piil Pesenggiri actually relates to positive meanings such as hospitality to guests, upholding dignity and self-respect, but often what appears is violence, laziness, arrogance and other actions which in the view of immigrants are associated with Piil Pesenggiri. Facing such a thing, Lampung ulun seeks to revitalize the value of Piil Pesenggiri as a representation of identity as well as to change the stigma, so that they are equal to immigrants, recognized and respected as local ethnicities (Sinaga, 2013).

Efforts to revitalize the local wisdom of the Lampung people are carried out by reviving the siger, as a symbol of community integration from two groups, namely the Lampung Pepadun and Saibatin tribes, as well as a symbol of majesty and honor. Siger is a unifying symbol that is seen in terms of shape, color and various other decorative accessories. With the siger, the people of Lampung are bound by a common culture, genealogy, socio-cultural life and even a sense of shared destiny. Siger is a propaganda tool to realize the integration of Lampung society, which is manifested in various ornaments of house buildings, markets, gates and government symbols as a manifestation of the plurality of the Lampung people (Ciciria, 2015).

One more example of a bottom-up conflict resolution in Lampung, which has a multicultural society. The emergence of the Sekelik Sedulur community, a community that was born from the idea as a form of concern for the environment with the hope of creating an atmosphere of peace, security, and prosperity. With the vision of preserving the good old culture and adopting a new and better culture; and the mission of establishing brotherhood by establishing harmony in the midst of diversity, this community has become a symbol of peace. In its movement, this community actively conducts social activities and builds networks with traditional leaders. This effort is called building social capital and can be a model in building inter-ethnic harmony (Syufa’at, Cahyono, and Madkur, 2017).

At the basic level, citizens can find ways to solve it themselves, but at the elite level - state and government - problem solving is always with an approach of power that is identical with violence. Therefore, what needs to be changed is the mindset of the state manager so as not to feel in power and can move anything with that power. Abuse of power
should not be used as a way of solving problems because the use of wrong power will actually cause problems later on.

**Conclusion**

Violence can be occurred anywhere, any time, and by anyone. Nevertheless, often the violence occurs in a place and the perpetrator is the same, causing stigma that in that place violence becomes familiar with everyday life. This is what happened to Indonesia so it was said to be a country of violence. Actually, Indonesia also has a concept of harmonious social life, reflected in the many local wisdoms that support it. However, social, customary, and legal institutions cannot work in the right place and at the right time to prevent the emergence of violence in solving humanitarian and social problems. The effort to prevent and resolve violence is to revitalize and re-actualize local wisdom for the community and change the mindset of the state apparatus in managing conflict and break the root chain of violence so as not to become a culture.

**Reference**


Violence Culture by State and Peoples in Solving Indonesian Humanities Issues

Agus Raharjo


[347]


